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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kenneth Franklin Felder appeals from the judgment and sentences 
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of three counts of lewd conduct 
with a minor under sixteen. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A grand jury indicted Felder on three counts of lewd conduct with a minor 
under sixteen for acts he committed against his step-daughter, A.K., over the 
course of two years, beginning when A.K. was eight or nine years old. (R., 
pp.12-13.) A.K. testiffed at trial that, when Felder tucked her in at night, he 
fondled her breasts, rubbed her vagina both underneath and over her clothes, 
penetrated her vagina with his fingers, licked her vagina, touched her anus with 
his fingers, and made her touch his "private parts" under his clothes. (Tr., p.49, 
p.66, L.23, p.71, L.24 - p.75, L.7.) The abuse began when A.K. was in third 
grade and continued into A.K.'s fifth grade year, when A.K. disclosed the abuse 
to a school counselor who, in turn, reported it to the police. (Tr., p.48, L.3 - p.53, 
L.20, p.56, Ls.9-12, p.58, Ls.22-24, p.62, Ls.4-10, p.66, Ls.20-23, p.67, L.21 - 
p.69, L.21, p.168, L.22-p.174, L.25, p.209, L.15-p.211, L.15.) 
When questioned by law enforcement, Felder admitted to having rubbed 
A.K.'s vagina "five to ten times over the course of [a] year and a half." (Tr., 
p.219, L.17 - p.220, L.4.) He subsequently wrote numerous letters of apology to 
A.K.'s mother, expressing remorse for having betrayed his family's trust and 
indicating a need for "help." (Tr., p.118, L.7 - p.119, L.4, p.120, L.12 - p.132, 
L.12; State's Exhibits 1-7.) When A.K.'s mother filed for divorce, more than two 
months after Felder had been arrested, Felder claimed for the first time that A.K. 
had fabricated the allegations. (Tr., p. 124, Ls.9-15, p.129, L.22 - p.130, L.l, 
p.132, L.21 - p.133, L.2.) He continued to deny the allegations at trial, testifying 
that A.K. did not like him because he was a strict disciplinarian, and that the only 
reason he told police he had sexually abused A.K. was because the police were 
threatening to take his children away from him. (Tr., p.261, L.22 - p.264, L.12, 
p.267, L.6 - p.270, L.17, p.273, L.6 - p.275, L.23, p.276, L.22 - p.280, L.2, 
p.281, Ls.14-25, p.289, L.19 - p.290, L. l ,  p.303, Ls.8-18, p.304, L.10 - p.305, 
L.6.) 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Felder guilty of ail three counts of 
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., pp 91-92.) The district court 
entered judgment on the jury's verdict and imposed concurrent unified sentences 
of 25 years, with 10 years determinate. (R., pp.97-99.) Felder filed a timely Rule 
35 motion for reduction of his sentences, which the district court denied. (R., 
pp. 1 10-1 8.) Felder timely appeals. (R., pp 101-03.) 
ISSUES 
Felder states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the State violate Mr. Felder's right to a fair trial, 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, 5 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution, by committing multiple acts of prosecutorial 
misconduct during closing arguments? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced 
Mr. Felder to twenty five years, with ten years fixed, to be 
sewed concurrently, for three counts of lewd conduct? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Felder failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct, much less 
misconduct that rose to the level of fundamental error and deprived him of 
a fair trial? 
2. Has Felder failed to establish that the sentences imposed upon his 
convictions for three counts of lewd conduct are excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts? 
ARGUMENT 
I. . 
Felder Has Failed To Establish That He Is Entitled To Relief With Respect To 
His Appellate Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Felder did not object at trial to the prosecutor's closing argument. 
Nevertheless, he contends on appeal that the prosecutor made statements 
during her closing argument that amounted to fundamental error and prejudiced 
his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) Felder's arguments are 
without merit. Felder has failed to show from the record that the prosecutor's 
arguments were erroneous, much less that they rose to the level of fundamental 
error and a de~rived him of a fair trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly improper 
closing arguments by the prosecutor, the alleged "misconduct will serve as a 
basis for setting aside a conviction 'only when the conduct is sufficiently 
egregious to result in fundamental error."' State v. Severson, 147 ldaho 694, 
__, 215 P.3d 414, 436 (2009) (quoting State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 
P.2d 127, 140 (1997)). Even if the alleged misconduct rises to the level of 
fundamental error, reversal is not required unless "the prosecutors' comments so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process." Darden v. Wainwriqht, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
C. Felder Has Not Shown Error. Fundamental Error. And A Denial Of Due 
Process. In the Prosecutor's Closina Arguments 
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument. State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, -, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009); State v. Porter, 130 
ldaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 14, 909 
P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). He or she is entitled to argue all reasonable 
inferences from the evidence in the record. Severson, 147 ldaho at , 215 
P.3d at 440; Porter, 130 ldaho at 786, 948 P.2d at 141 (citing State v. Garcia, 
100 ldaho 108, 110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979)). Thus, to show error, Felder 
bears the appellate burden of showing from the record that the prosecutor's 
arguments were not based upon the evidence and other events at trial. 
Because he did not object to the prosecutor's arguments at trial, Felder 
also bears the burden of establishing that the errors he claims were 
fundamental. Severson, 147 ldaho at -, 215 P.3d at 436; State v. Field, 144 
ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); Priest, 128 ldaho at 13, 909 P.2d at 
631. Fundamental error is error that "goes to the foundation of a defendant's 
rights or ... to the foundation of the case or takeis] from the defendant a right 
which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit 
him to waive." Severson, 147 ldaho at , 215 P.3d at 436 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted, ellipsis and brackets original). To carry his 
burden of showing fundamental error, Felder must demonstrate that the 
allegedly improper comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any 
prejudice arising therefrom could not have been remedied by a timely objection 
and a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be 
disregarded. State v. Smith, 117 ldaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 (1990); 
Priest, 128 ldaho at 13, 909 P.2d at 631. 
Finally, Felder also bears the burden of showing that the errors he 
complains of rise to the level of creating an unfair trial: "[Tlhe touchstone of due 
process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of 
the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 
219 (1982). See also State v. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 
1008 (Ct. App. 1991) (the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the 
prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not 
interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial"). "[A] criminal conviction is not to 
be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for 
the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be 
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, (1985). The court must consider the 
probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's ability to 
judge the evidence fairly." at 11-12. 
Felder argues that the prosecutor, in closing argument, improperly 
vouched for the credibility of the victim and, in so doing, also misrepresented 
facts in evidence and shifted the burden of proof to the defense. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.8-12.) He also argues that the prosecutor used inflammatory tactics to 
appeal to the emotions, passions, or prejudices of the jury. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.12-13.) Felder has failed to show error because his arguments at best ignore 
the applicable legal standards, and at worst distort the prosecutor's statements 
by omitting context and asserting egregious meanings to proper argument. 
When reviewed both in context and giving the arguments even reasonable 
meanings, it is clear that the arguments were not error, much less fundamental 
error, and did not deprive Felder of his due process right to a fair trial. 
1. The Prosecutor Did Not Vouch For The Victim, Misrepresent Facts 
In Evidence, Or Shift The Burden Of Proof To The Defense 
Felder's theory of the defense at trial was that A.K. had fabricated the 
allegations against him because she was mad at him for being a strict 
disciplinarian and for losing his temper with her a few days before she disclosed 
the sexual abuse to her school counselor. (Tr., p.39, Ls.13-24, p.261, L.22 - 
p.264, L.12, p.267, L.6 - p.277, L.16.) In discussing A.K.'s credibility, the 
prosecutor made the following statements during closing argument: 
For you to believe that [A.K.] would somehow be able to 
make up these allegations and that somehow in doing so, that 
the state would be able to wrap itself around the allegations 
and just happen to find all of these coincidences would make 
you think that [A.K.] is so sophisticated and so smart that she 
could fool people who do this every day, that her disclosures 
about third grade just happened to coincide with the fact that the 
defendant was the sole care provider in the third grade; that when 
she is in the fourth grade and she gets called into a counseling 
group and she's disconnected and having social problems, that we 
would be able to realize that it is still going on. And that in fifth 
grade when she finally tells about what has happened here, that we 
would learn from the defendant that he so threatened her, 
information we had never heard before, ever. 
See, [A.K.] couldn't possibly put all of that together. The 
only thing she can tell you is that what was happening from year to 
year, and it is the outside circumstances that have caught up with 
what has happened here, which makes it all so much more credible 
for her; credible for you, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that you 
should convict him of these crimes, that for [A.K.] in this instance, 
she should be seen and heard and believed by you. 
(Tr., p.339, L.13 - p.340, L.16 (emphasis added).) 
Focusing solely on the emphasized portion of the above argument, Felder 
claims on appeal that the prosecutor engaged in impermissible vouching. 
Specifically, he contends that "by placing itself in the arguments and implying 
that the victim could not fool the State, the prosecutor was vouching for the 
believability of A.K." (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) Felder's claim of improper 
vouching fails, however, because it ignores both the applicable legal standards 
and the context in which the argument was made. 
It is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal belief or opinion 
regarding the credibility of any testimony or evidence presented at trial. State v. 
m, 130 ldaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Garcia, 100 
ldaho 108, 110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979); State v. Gross, 146 ldaho 15, 18, 189 
P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 
632 (Ct. App. 1995). Prosecutors enjoy a considerable amount of latitude in 
closing argument, however, and may fully discuss the evidence and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. Priest, 128 ldaho at 14, 909 P.2d at 632. 
This includes the right to comment on how the evidence presented at trial 
reflects, for good or ill, on the credibility of any witness. State v. Lovelass, 133 
ldaho 160, 168, 983 P.2d 233,241 (Ct. App. 1999); m, 128 ldaho at 14,909 
P.2d at 632. See also Garcia, 100 ldaho at 110 n.1, 594 P.2d at 148 n.1 
(prosecutor may, in argument, express an opinion as to the truth or falsity of 
testimony when such opinion is based upon the evidence). 
Applying these legal standards to the facts of this case shows the 
prosecutor's argument, in context, to be proper. The prosecutor did not, as 
Felder contends, argue to the jury that it should believe A.K. because the "people 
who do this everyday, including the prosecutor's office," believed her. 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) Nor did the prosecutor argue, implicitly or otherwise, that 
"the State would not be able to find all the coincidences if [A.K.] was not 
believable." (Id.) On the contrary, in asking the jury to find A.K. credible, the 
prosecutor made specific reference to the evidence of outside circumstances 
that corroborated A.K.'s testimony' (not the other way around) and argued the 
reasonable inference therefrom - i.e., that A.K. could not possibly have been so 
sophisticated as to fabricate the allegations of sexual abuse in such a way as to 
coincide with other events that were occurring at the time. (Tr., p.339, L.13 - 
p.340, L.16.) Because the prosecutor focused her argument on the evidence 
' A.K. testified at trial that Felder began sexually abusing her when she was in 
third grade. (Tr., p.48, L.3 - p.56, L.1.) According to A.K., the abuse always 
occurred at night, when Felder tucked her into bed. (Tr., p.48, L.3 - p.49, L.14, 
p.56, Ls.9-12, p.64, Ls.8-12, p.66, Ls.20-23.) A.K.'s mother, Angela, testified 
that she began working nights when A.K. was in third grade and, as a result, 
Felder was the sole caretaker of A.K. and her siblings and was responsible for 
overseeing their nightly activities, including putting them to bed. (Tr., p.104, L.12 
- p.105, L.18.) Angela also testified that A.K. had always done well in school, 
but that she started to have "emotional problems" during her third grade year. 
(Tr., p.108, L.24 - p.109, L.5.) A.K. continued to have emotional issues and 
seemed somewhat disengaged during her fourth grade year and was referred by 
her fourth grade teacher to a support group facilitated by the school counselor. 
(Tr., p.109, Ls.6-10, p.162, L.18 - p.163, L.25, p.180, L.25 - p.182, L.10.) The 
next year, when A.K. was in fifth grade, the school counselor visited A.K.'s 
classroom and gave a presentation on inappropriate touching. (Tr., p.67, L.17 - 
p.68, L.9, p.166, L.7 - p.169, L.9.) After seeing the presentation, A.K. first told a 
friend that Felder had touched her inappropriately and then disclosed the sexual 
abuse to the school counselor and, ultimately, to the police and CARES. (Tr., 
p.68, L.lO- p.71, L.21, p.169, L.10 - p.171, L.23, p.195, L.16- p.197, L.13.) 
that reflected favorably on A.K.'s credibility, and did not express a personal 
opinion about the truth or falsity of A.K.'s testimony, the argument was proper. 
Garcia, 100 ldaho at 11 0-1 1, 594 P.2d 148-49; Priest, 128 ldaho at 14,909 P.2d 
at 632. Felder's attempt to show otherwise by omitting the context in which the 
argument was made does not show error, much less fundamental error that 
deprived him of a fair trial. 
Felder has also failed to show error, fundamental or otherwise, in the 
following excerpt from the prosecutor's closing argument: 
She tells her friend. Her friend encourages her to tell [the 
school counselor]. She goes to CARES. She tells CARES what 
happened. And ladies and gentlemen, what is important about all 
of this is that each of these persons has come to testify, not her 
little friend ..., but all these other people have come. And if she 
had said anything inconsistent, [A.K.] had been inconsistent with 
[the counselor], with CARES, with what the police understood, you 
would have heard about it. 
You would have heard about it in cross examination. You 
would have heard how he brings out inconsistencies in [A.K.'s] 
stories, just as the state did with the defendant and how 
inconsistent he has been throughout his entire testimony today with 
what he told Detective Zakarian seven and a half months ago. You 
see, you would have known if [A.K.] had been inconsistent about 
any of it, but you never heard about it at all. 
(Tr., p.328, L.14 - p.329, L.8.) Felder claims, in conclusory fashion, that "[tlhis 
argument similarly vouches for the victim, implying that the prosecutor knows 
A.K, has never been inconsistent." (Appellant's brief, p.10.) Once again, Felder 
is incorrect. 
The arguments made by the prosecutor in this case are similar to those 
made by the prosecutor and deemed proper in Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 909 P.2d 
624. Referring to the credibility of the state's witnesses in that case, the 
prosecutor in &t argued, among other things: 
And I guess the question that may be asked is, why should you 
believe these witnesses? But for a second I'd like to just turn it 
around a little bit. Why should you not believe these witnesses? 
Have any of them in this courtroom on cross-examinafion been 
shown to be lying about what fhey fold you? Have any of them 
been impeached? The answer is no, they haven't been .... 
priest, 128 Idaho at 14, 909 P.2d at 632 (emphasis and ellipsis original). Like 
Felder, Priest argued that the prosecutor's comments "impl[ied] that he was privy 
to information corroborating the witnesses' testimony that was unknown to the 
jury, [and] that he was personally vouching for the credibility of his witnesses." 
Id. The Priest court rejected this argument, however, finding that it was apparent -
from the context in which the challenged statements were made "that the 
prosecutor was merely analyzing the evidence bearing upon witnesses' credibility 
and stating the conclusions which he urged the jury to draw therefrom." Id. 
As in priest, a review of the context in which the prosecutor made the 
challenged statements in this case also shows them to be proper argument. The 
prosecutor did not imply that she had personal knowledge A.K. had never been 
inconsistent. Rather, as in m t ,  the prosecutor analyzed the evidence bearing 
on A.K.'s credibility, including the absence of any evidence showing 
inconsistencies in A.K.'s reports of sexual abuse, and asked the jury to draw 
reasonable inferences therefrom. Like Priest, Felder has failed to show from the 
record that the prosecutor's comments regarding A.K.'s credibility were based on 
anything other than the evidence presented at trial and, as such, has failed to 
make even a prima facie showing of impermissible vouching. Priest, 128 Idaho 
at 14, 909 P.2d at 632. 
In addition to claiming improper vouching, Felder also contends for the 
first time on appeal that, by arguing that the jury would have heard about any 
inconsistencies in A.K.'s story, the prosecutor misrepresented facts in evidence. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) To support his position, Felder relies on 
Washinaton v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689 (dh Cir. 2000), a child sex abuse case in 
which the prosecutor argued to the jury that it had heard from the victim's 
mother, the doctor, the social worker, m d  the victim herself "and nowhere for the 
most part based upon what happened, has if [the child's version of events] 
changed." 228 F.3d at 700 (emphasis original). However, because none of the 
individuals identified by the prosecutor, nor any other trial witness, had actually 
testified to the substance of their conversations with the victim, the Hofbauer 
court held that the prosecutor's statement that the victim's story had not changed 
constituted a misstatement of the evidence. Id. at 700-01. 
The facts of Hofbauer are easily distinguishable from the facts of this 
case. Unlike the prosecutor in Hofbauer who, based on the testimony of the 
several witnesses to whom the victim had made disclosures, affirmatively 
represented that the victim's story had never changed, the prosecutor in this 
case never made such an affirmative representation. Consistent with the 
evidence presented at trial, the prosecutor did note that A.K. had disclosed the 
abuse to several people, including her friend, the school counselor, and the staff 
at CARES. However, unlike the prosecutor in Hofbauer, the prosecutor in this 
case did not affirmatively state that the evidence showed A.K.'s version of events 
had not changed over time, nor could she have since, as in Hofbauer, none of 
the witnesses testified to the substance of A.K.'s disclosures. Instead, the 
prosecutor accurately pointed out that Felder had not presented any evidence, 
either directly or through cross-examination of the state's witnesses, to show any 
inconsistencies in A.K.'s disclosures, and she asked the jury to draw the 
reasonable inference from the lack of any impeachment evidence that A.K.'s 
disclosures must have been consistent over time. Such was proper argument, 
see Priest, 128 ldaho at 14, 909 P.2d at 632, and did not misrepresent the -- 
evidence presented at trial. 
Finally, contrary to Felder's claim on appeal (see Appellant's brief, p . l l ) ,  
the prosecutor's comments regarding the absence of any evidence that A.K.'s 
disclosures were ever inconsistent did not shift the burden of proof to the 
defense. See State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 
2007) (it is error for a prosecutor in closing argument to misrepresent the law or 
the reasonable doubt burden). Although the state undoubtedly bears the burden 
of proof at trial, a point made clear by the court in its instructions (Instruction 
Nos. A, 4, 15-17) and by the prosecutor herself in closing argument (Tr., p.372, 
Ls.1-6), it is not improper for the prosecutor to note the absence of evidence on 
a particular point. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965); State v. 
Hodqes, 105 ldaho 588, 591-92, 671 P.2d 1051, 1054-55 (1983); State v. 
McMurry, 143 ldaho 312, 143 P.3d 400, 402 (Ct. App. 2006). This is particularly 
true where, as here, the defendant elects to testify and present evidence on his 
own behalf. (&, generally, Tr., pp.256-309.) 
Felder testified that he never touched A.K. sexually and implied that the 
only reason she said he did was because she was mad at him and wanted her 
mother and Felder to get a divorce. (Tr., p.261, L.22 - p.264, L.12, p.267, L.6 - 
p.277, L.16, p.279, Ls.13-20, p.289, L.19 - p.290, L.1.) In response to this 
general attack on the veracity of A.K.'s allegations, it was perfectly proper for the 
prosecutor to highlight the absence of any evidence that A.K.'s disclosures were 
inconsistent even though Felder clearly had the ability to highlight any such 
inconsistencies through cross-examination had they existed. This was not 
improper burden-shifting; it was a proper comment on the evidence and the fact 
that there was no reason to question A.K.'s credibility given the evidence 
presented. m t ,  128 Idaho at 14, 909 P.2d at 632. Felder has failed to show 
error, much less fundamental error and a deprivation of his due process rights. 
2. The Prosecutor Did Not lmproperlv Appeal To The Jurors' 
Emotions 
At the conclusion of her closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury 
to return a verdict of guilty, arguing "that for [A.K.] in this instance, she should be 
seen and heard and believed by you. Convict him for what he has done to her." 
(Tr., p.340, Ls.14-18.) Felder did not object to this argument at trial. 
Nevertheless, he claims on appeal that the argument was an improper appeal "to 
the emotions of the jury and a sense of community justice by asking the jury to 
convict the defendant not based on the evidence admitted at trial but to show the 
young victim that they believe her and to convict the defendant for the alleged 
harm that he has caused her rather than based on the evidence." (Appellant's 
brief, pp.12-13.) Felder's claim is without merit. While it is undoubtedly improper 
to invite the jury to convict based on emotion or sympathy for the victim, see, 
Q, State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, -, 215 P 3d 414, 439-40 (2009); State 
v. Gross, 146 ldaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct. App. 2008), State v. Phillips, 
144 ldaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007), a review of the 
prosecutor's argument, in context, shows she did not invite the jury to do so in 
this case. 
Before making the complained of comments, the prosecutor had taken the 
jury through the jury instructions, the evidence establishing the elements of the 
charged crimes, and the evidence that reflected favorably on A.K.'s credibility . 
and negatively on Felder's credibility. (Tr., p.322, L.17 - p.340, L.12.) After 
spending nearly her entire opening argument discussing the elements and the 
proof, especially that bearing on the jury's credibility determinations, the 
prosecutor ultimately asked the jury to find Felder guilty, not because A.K. was a 
sympathetic victim, but because the evidence showed beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Felder committed three counts of lewd conduct against A.K., just as 
A.K. had alleged. (See Tr., p.340, Ls.10-14 ("[lit is the outside circumstances 
that have caught up with what has happened here, which makes it all so much 
more credible for her; credible for you, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that you 
should convict him of these crimes . . . .").) Given this context it is clear that the 
prosecutor's reference to A.K 's believability was not an inflammatory appeal for 
the jury to render its decision on anything other than the evidence presented at 
trial. Felder has again failed to show error, much less fundamental error that 
deprived him of a fair trial. See State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, -, 216 P.3d 
146, 152-53 (Ct. App. 2009) (prosecutor's request for justice for victims not 
inflammatory appeal to convict on anything other than evidence and, therefore, 
not fundamental error, where remarks came immediately after description of how 
the trial evidence proved Adams' guilt). 
/I. 
Felder Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencins Court's Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Felder argues that the concurrent unified sentences of 25 years, with ten 
10 years fixed, imposed upon his convictions for three counts of lewd conduct 
with a minor are unduly harsh and excessive. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-16.) The 
record, however, clearly supports the sentences imposed; Felder has failed to 
establish an abuse of the sentencing court's discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a district court's sentencing determination, the question 
before this Court is not what sentence it would have imposed, but rather, 
whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 ldaho 139, 
148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 568, 
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)). The length of a sentence is reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. 
State v. Oliver, 144 ldaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. 
Strand, 137 ldaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 
ldaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the 
sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. (citing State 
v. Trevino, 132 ldaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). 
C.  Felder Has Failed To Establish That His Sentence Is Excessive Under 
Any Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Felder was convicted, after a two-day jury trial, of three counts of lewd 
conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., pp.91-92.) The victim, Felder's step- 
daughter, was just eight'or nine years old when Felder began entering her room 
at night and rubbing her breasts, fondling and licking her vagina, touching her 
anus with his fingers, and making her touch his penis, all for the purpose of 
gratifying his own sexual desires. (R., pp.12-13; Tr., p.49, L.8 - p.52, L.25, p.54, 
L.23 - p.56, L.12, p.58, L.19 - p.61, L.14, p.62, L.4 - p.66, L.23, p.71, L.24 - 
p.75, L.7.) Despite the fact that the jury found Felder guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of sexually abusing his step-daughter over a period of two years, and 
despite the fact that he admitted as much when initially questioned by the police, 
he has since never accepted responsibility nor expressed any remorse for his 
actions. (Tr., p.368, Ls.3-6; PSI, pp.2-3, 13; Psychosexual Eval., pp.5-6, 16.) 
Felder's character, together with the seriousness of the offense and his 
demonstrated unwillingness andlor inability to be rehabilitated, ail support the 
reasonableness of the sentence imposed. 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 ldaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 ldaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 ldaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to 
achieve the primary objective of protecting society, or any of the related 
sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id. 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court specifically 
considered the objectives of sentencing (Tr., p.375, L.22 - p 376, L.lO), the 
presentence report (Tr., p.376, Ls.1-3), and the psychosexual evaluation, in 
which the evaluator opined that Felder is not a good candidate for sexual 
offender treatment and poses a moderate to high risk to sexually reoffend (Tr., 
p.376, Ls.3-4; Psychosexual Eval., pp.1, 14, 16-17). The court reviewed nature 
of the crime, including "the fact that it was a repeated offense" and involved "a 
very young innocent victim." (Tr., p.376, L.23 - p.377, t.1.) Based upon all of 
the information before it, including Felder's demonstrated unwillingness or 
inability to accept responsibility for his actions, the court ultimately concluded 
that the imposition of a 25-year sentence, with a ten-year fixed term, was 
necessary to protect society. (Tr., p.376, Ls.8-14.) 
On appeal, Felder does not even address the nature of the offense or 
whether the sentence imposed was necessary to achieve the objectives of 
sentencing. Instead, he claims that "the district court should have adequately 
considered the mitigating circumstances in his case, including the fact that this 
was his first felony, his positive employment history and the support he received 
from family and friends." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) This argument fails for two 
independent reasons. 
First, all of the information Felder claims the district court should have 
considered was included in the PSI and was before the court at the time of 
sentencing. (& PSI, pp.3-6 (setting forth Felder's criminal history and noting 
people who submitted letters of support), pp.10-11 (employment history); 13 
letters of support, attached to PSI.) The court obviously considered this 
information, as it specifically advised Felder that it had "taken into account the 
fact that [Felder was] not a career criminal" and had "been a productive member 
of society." (Tr., p.377, Ls. 13-17.) Because Felder has not shown that the 
court did not consider the factors he claims are mitigating there is no basis for his 
claim that the district court abused its sentencing d~scretion. 
Second, while the factors Felder claims are mitigating may have some 
relevancy to sentencing, a sentencing court is not required to assess or balance 
all of the sentencing goals in an equal manner. State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 
186, 857 P.2d 663, 665 (Ct. App. 1993). As the district court in this case pointed 
out, Felder repeatedly victimized his step-daughter over a period of years but 
adamantly refused to accept responsibility for his actions. (Tr., p.376, L.4 - 
p.377, L.12.) The district court considered Felder a threat to public safety and 
determined that the sentence imposed was necessary to protect the community. 
(Tr., p.376, L.8 - p.377, L.19.) That the court did not elevate the mitigating 
factors Felder cites above the need to protect society does not establish an 
abuse of discretion. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Felder has failed to 
establish that his sentence is excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this court affirm Felder's convictions 
and sentences. 
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